Progress has had a constant effect in beliefs, practices, technologies, and identities all around the globe. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, its change in identity led people to powerfully align themselves along the relatively new concept of a strong and centralized nation. With this change crept by many innovations, some militaristic and some which were intended for civilian use only. As early as the American Civil War, many of these innovations, as outlined by the Prussian general Erich Ludendorff, set apart this new total war from the limited warfare of old: modern transportation, mass mobilization, propaganda campaigns, wartime economy and legislation, and single authority leadership. Furthermore, this new warfare raged now between nations for total victory or total annihilation, rather than limited warfare’s use only by professional armies as an extension of public policy. The formation of modern nations in the twentieth century, as well as the innovations bespoken by General Ludendorff thenceforth released all belligerent parties from the former constraints of warfare, till the advent of total war and its unprecedented costs.
The first factor that released nations practically from former constraints seen in limited warfare was modern transportation. This progress came in the form of motorized transportation, in particular with trains (and later automobiles). Trains by themselves had a powerful effect on stimulating the economy, and ultimately the growth of society. They accomplished such ends by bettering the distribution of goods, increasing production and, subsequently, product turnover, as well as connecting otherwise remote areas of the world (Lewis, 1936). This interconnectedness and newly sustainable increase in the speed of life can equally be applied to war. In the same manner that trains made the transportation of goods and people much faster and more efficient, in wartime they allowed an unprecedented high speed transportation of supplies and soldiers (Weisner, Wheeler, Doeringer, & Curtis, 2011). Though the use of modern transportation largely began with trains and steamships in the American Civil War, their full utilization did not take off till the modern warfare of World War 1. Just as trains increased the interconnectivity of regions, they allowed for rapid deployment, reformation, and redeployment from all across the nation to multiple battlefronts. This can be seen, for example, in the French Army during the Great War, even with the unprecedented new masses of thousands of soldiers, organization of the French army by trains took only a matter of weeks, and deployment followed swiftly (Pourcher, 2012). Without modern transportation, the infrastructure within the nation allowing a sustainable total war, as well as the infrastructure connecting the homefront to battlefronts, could not be effected practically, and thus total war would never have been realized.
The second factor of total war, and mayhap the most recognizable, is mass mobilization. By conscripting regular civilians to be citizen-soldiers, the people of the nation as a whole were directly tied to the war. Mass mobilization meant every citizen of the nation served in the war effort, as opposed to its being some sort of wistful coffeehouse topic for occasional geopolitical musing. (Weisner et al., 2011). The identification of these men was at the national level; they were soldiers who owed their allegiance first and foremost to the flag. Despite this, they brought with them to the front their views, beliefs, and representation within the government while they entered total war (Williams, 1944). Now an, at least at first, seemingly infinite number of reinforcements could be sent to fill the boots of fallen soldiers, sustaining the war effort indefinitely. This development in warfare helps to explain the paradox of the seemingly sudden surge of power in the French nation during the Napoleonic Wars. In spite of the revolution and turmoil immediately beforehand, France, now united in a new national conscious, was able to conquer huge swaths of Central Europe and elsewhere. To this end, its then unforeseen (in Europe) use of mass mobilization became integral in both unification and conquest (von Clausewitz, 1832). With mass mobilization, the outcome of total war hinged on national resources, large scale operations, and most importantly the people, rather than the extreme skill in tactics, training, and valor of the professional armies of old limited war.
The third factor, propaganda, served to raise awareness and involve the entire nation, as necessitated by total war. Excluding revolutionary wars, which by nature involve a “nation” (at such a stage still disputed), the first propaganda campaigns became commonplace around the American Civil War. The propaganda therein was largely divided between the political ideologies of Democrats and Republicans (today with opposite names), forming a “press war” (Williams, 1944). Newspapers, poster, pamphlets, and the like were often distributed to whole regiments within the union armies to advocate some position or leaning in regards to the war effort or structure of the army. Many times Republicans preached paranoia of Democrats’ being pro-slavery, and Democrats claimed it was Republicans’ intentions to put racial views first and divide the army. (Williams, 1944) Propaganda had become such an integral part of the war that, “Not a little propaganda was disseminated by officers in speeches and letters to the press. Sometimes officers sought promotion on the grounds that they could preach the creed of their party more effectively with a higher rank.” (Williams, 1944, 202). After the end of Napoleonic warfare and beginning with modern warfare in World War 1, the use of propaganda became far more integral to total war. Now fierce propaganda campaigns were launched to unite the collective national conscience against the enemy. This was seen particularly in World War II, as nationalism erupted across Central and Eastern Europe as well as Japan. In the heart of Europe in 1942, for example, Reichsmarschall Göring called for the strength and continued dedication of the German folk despite hard times. He also ensured to paint the picture of his enemies; he included at the end of the speech that America was nothing to be feared (despite its enormous resources) if everyone continued working for the war effort (Goering, 1942). Propaganda was not exclusive to the relatively extremist powers in modern warfare, instead state supported propaganda campaigns were made in relatively politically moderate nations such as the United States. In the First World War for example, “the federal government had conducted a national preparedness campaign” (Witowski, 2003, 71). This campaign preached the necessity of frugality for America during the war. Later, posters in the 1940s were still the primary form of propaganda, handled by the Office of War Information. One of its largest themes was, aside from motivation to work featuring symbolic figures such as Rosie the Riveter and Uncle Sam, a stress on frugality and consumption awareness (Witkowski, 2003). Propaganda campaigns in this way, and in general, forged a national expectation of civil service, becoming a necessary help in the drive of a new national war effort not seen till total war.
As the entire nation went to war, the demands and goals of society shifted, necessitating a wartime economy and wartime legislation. Most of the people within the nation now labored in the production and manufacture of goods and services destined for war. A wartime economy also meant a brand new, and seemingly insatiable demand, the war effort. This was especially visible in the German nation, as Germany’s economy had been annihilated after the First World War. Hitler rebuilt his nation’s economy, strongly dedicated to wartime, inspired in part because “Germany, it was argued, should not be caught unprepared for war again… making up its wartime economic administration as it went along” (Overy, 1988, 614). By instituting a new four-year plan and making startling advancements, he gearing the nation toward conquest and empire never before seen with the scope of limited war, now labeled neo-imperialism. A great emphasis, in order to make this huge undertaking of large scale production more sustainable, was placed on conservation. During Göring’s radio broadcast, he reminded all Germans of this, advising them to use as little gas, food, and other sources to help win the war (Goering, 1942). The common people themselves had to economize as much as possible, and when put on a national scale, this made a significant contribution. On the allied side, the Americans did the same; they helped to sustain the wartime economy by minimizing consumption, collecting recyclable materials (notably scrap metal), and growing victory gardens (Witkowski, 2003). With the general populace and its economy now involved in the war, an overhaul of legislation was necessitated to guide the war effort and wartime economy, often meaning stricter legislation and more restrictive personal lives. In the case of the Japanese in the Second World War, this meant the permission of the state to directly collect from the citizens the fruits of their labor, and, like most other nations of the time, to distribute rations. This could lead to exploitive destruction in the lives of Japanese families, but the preservation of the war effort (Taya & Cook, 1994). In America near the beginning of the Great War, regulation had to be put in place for public transportation. Now for the war effort, trains were repurposed, connecting the nation to the war. In World War 1, legislation took effect “[f]rom the night of 2-3 August 1914… The rail system was placed under the authority of the minister of war. No more passenger, no more messengers, no more goods: just soldiers” (Pourcher, 2012, 88). The ally in the east, the Soviet Union, used legislation largely to minimize civil rights and liberties, and thus make the war effort more expedient. When war finally came, legislation only became more restrictive, such as with anyone spreading rumors a few years in prison, or if an intentional effort to disrupt public order, execution on sight (Hazard, 1942). In this way, the Soviet Union, which already had both a state-controlled and state-owned economy, as well as minimal civil liberties, required relatively little change of legislation when the Second World War dawned (Hazard, 1942). In total, a wartime economy meant maximum supply (or the pursuit thereof) and minimal consumption, while wartime legislation guide and regulate the nation for a more efficient war, even at the expense of personal rights and liberties. In total war, these two concepts involved the masses most broadly, and together are what became the war effort and homefront.
Finally, with all of these major innovations, total war required a single authority, or leader, who would connect the people of the nation to the war, as well as represent them as a whole. Only in revolutionary wars which, again by nature must involve what would constitute as an entire nation, had single authorities risen to guide a national war effort, such as Cromwell or Washington. Now however, beginning with the American Civil War, Lincoln on the union side rose to lead the new national war effort. He brought together common citizens of all kinds of beliefs, including the then nearly irreconcilable Democrats and Republicans, and successfully waged war to reunite the nation (Williams, 1944). Just as generals had done for armies in limited war, rallying for the single authority now meant uniting and guiding the huge national conscience in the war. Such was the position of Napoleon during the, aptly named, Napoleonic Wars. After the bloody French Revolution, Napoleon rose to the challenge and promised a new empire. (von Clausewitz, 1832). A testament to the effectiveness of his national leadership can be seen through his contemporaries, such as Duke Wellington and von Clausewitz, who, heading professional, and not yet national armies, were only able to overcome him in a coalition. For certain times and places, a single authority’s rise was undoubtedly easier. In the modern, industrialized, state-controlled, ideologically driven Soviet Union, this was the case. Using the power Stahlin already had invested over the people and the nation, as well as with sentiments of fear from the First World War, he easily manipulated his nation for the Second World War (Hazard, 1942). Beyond the Soviet Union, by World War II, this theme was common among all the major powers at the time. Due to this, Freda Utley, an outspoken American communist turned ardent anticommunist after living in the Soviet Union, feared for the future of mankind in the state dominance of the nation. Germany and Russia, she claimed, seemed to have started from opposite sides of the spectrum, but in time the only underlying difference was that in the former, the economy was practically state-controlled, while in the latter it was entirely state-owned. It is a testament to the magnitude of which central figures had commandeered their nations during wartime, that she believed the they could threaten democracy itself in peace (Utley, 1941). In this way, a single authority, or leader, was required to connect and drive the new national effort, even with the potential of coming to the point of fundamental changes in the role of the state in private life.
This new type of war, now between nations, had devastating costs compared to limited war. Now, with whole nations taking the place of professional militaries, rather than just the destruction of armies, casualties meant entire nations burning. The most immediate visible cost was with the people. In World War I, for example, in the Battle of the Somme alone fell nearly half a million soldiers of the British Empire, and to make matters worse, such men, across the British, French, German, and other nations, were considered often the best of youth the world could offer (George, 1916). This ultimately led up to the destruction of both men and material, lives in the number of millions across all sides were lost, and cities and infrastructure which supported them were destroyed as well (Haig, 1919). This occurred predominantly in Europe which suffered the bulk of total war (but also in East Asia in World War II). In turn this lead to the displacement of people. Those who outlived total war, particularly the modern warfare variant, were displaced, without a job or place to call home. This is seen in detail in the life of Arakawa Hiroyo, whose family business was run to the ground and ultimately had to resettle elsewhere. Her experience also serves as a testament to the huge national strain on resources, including the most basic of foods which had to be rationed (Taya & Cook, 1994). Total war also brought a cost to international relations. As wars were fought between nations, feuds, aggression, and other such sentiments became engraved in the national conscience and were only to die down with generations, rather than only living as far as the generals or other such leaders of war themselves. This is most clearly seen in how the Second World War became an extension of the First World War (i. e. through German sentiment that the nation was wronged) (Overy, 1988). This effect, by extension, may be stipulated in the southern sentiments of resistance to the north in the United States, the unification of Germany through the view of France as a common and continuous threat, and ultimately the entire Cold War between the US and the USSR. On the level of the private citizen, the worst of costs came to personal freedom. The increasing use of entire nation in the military affairs of the state meant the reduction of democracy and legal rights and liberties. In the modern era, this was startlingly, and quickly becoming a precedent in many nations, such as the ever growing Soviet Union and the Third Reich, as well as the People’s Republic of China (Utley, 1941). On one final note, with all these costs of total war, it ultimately costed the hope of the people, and the belief that the world was continually making progress, particularly with Europe as the leader (Valéry, 1919). The world would now fully understand the meaning of total war.
Undoubtedly, since the birth of total war in the American Civil War, with the innovations outlined by General Ludendorff: modern transportation, mass mobilization, propaganda campaigns, wartime legislation and economy, and single authority leadership, warfare has been forever changed. These (and these are only a few of the many advances of total war) have shifted the scope of power by nationalizing war itself, and such power comes at a high price, one impossible to have foreseen in the days of limited war. Ultimately, this all builds to answer to General Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz’s question about whether war will ever see limits again, or be total forever hereafter. Such a question is one he could not possibly have known, but one to which a twofold conjecture may now be made. First, he is right about the fate of limited warfare. While similarly limited, albeit technologically advanced, warfare may live on in so called proxy wars and military operations, the essence of war itself, as he argues (or what we know simply to be war) has been forever changed. A direct testament to this can be seen in the great cessation of declarations of war, as a war now means total war, something the world is too wary to declare after its second chance with it. On the other hand, however, he is wrong about war’s eternal fate; instead, it is dynamic. What we know as war still continues to change. As from limited (be it ancient or medieval) to total (napoleonic or modern), it has as with progress in general, accelerated, reaching the next stage more rapidly than ever. This relatively new stage, nuclear war (whether atomic or thermonuclear), through its terrible implications has bidden to unite not nations, but all of mankind in the common concern for survival, and in effect, has rendered (hopefully) practical war obsolete.
George, D. L. (1933). Lloyd George on the Battle of the Somme, July 1, 1916. In M. E. Weisner, W. B. Wheeler, F. M. Doeringer, & K. R. Curtis (Eds.), Discovering the Global Past, Volume II (pp. 379-380). Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Goering, H. (1942). German Radio Broadcast, October 4, 1942. In M. E. Weisner, W. B. Wheeler, F. M. Doeringer, & K. R. Curtis (Eds.), Discovering the Global Past, Volume II (pp. 392-394). Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Haig, D. (1919). Features of the War. In M. E. Weisner, W. B. Wheeler, F. M. Doeringer, & K. R. Curtis (Eds.), Discovering the Global Past, Volume II (pp. 382-384). Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Hazard, J. N. (1942). Soviet Wartime Legislation. Russian Review, 2(1). 22-30. doi: 10.2307/125270
Taya, H. & Cook, T. F. (1994). The End of a Bake Shop: Reminiscence of Arakawa Hiroyo. In M. E. Weisner, W. B. Wheeler, F. M. Doeringer, & K. R. Curtis (Eds.), Discovering the Global Past, Volume II (pp. 398-400). Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Lewis, W. M. (1936). The Significance of Transportation to Civilization. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 187, 1-6. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1019605
Overy, R. J. (1988). Mobilization for Total War in Germany 1939-1941. The English Historical Review, 103(408), 613-639. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/572694
Pourcher, Y. (2012). Trains in World War I. Historical Reflections, 38(1), 87-104.
Utley, F. (1941). Can Democracy Survive Total War? Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (216), 9-15. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1023697
Valéry, P. (1957). The Crisis of the Spirit. In M. E. Weisner, W. B. Wheeler, F. M. Doeringer, & K. R. Curtis (Eds.), Discovering the Global Past, Volume II (pp. 385-386). Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Von Clausewitz, C. P. G. (1832). On War. In M. E. Weisner, W. B. Wheeler, F. M. Doeringer, & K. R. Curtis (Eds.), Discovering the Global Past, Volume II (pp. 378-379). Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Williams, T. H. (1944). Voters in Blue: The Citizen Soldiers of the Civil War. The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 31(2), 187-204. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1893423
Witkowski, T. H. (2003). World War II Poster Campaigns: Preaching Frugality to American Consumers. Journal of Advertising, 32(1), 69-82. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4622151
Weisner, M. E., Wheeler, W. B., Doeringer, F. M., & Curtis, K. R. (2011). Discovering the Global Past, Volume II. Boston, Massachusetts: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.